Pakistan could be key to Afghanistan’s plan for reconciliation with the Taliban

Pakistan could be key to Taliban reconciliation

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s links with Taliban leaders believed based in the country could prove vital to the Afghan government’s renewed push to make peace with the insurgents, a potential benefit from relationships that have been relentlessly criticized by the U.S.

But experts warn that even Pakistan, which armed and funded the Taliban in the 1990s, is limited in its ability to push through a deal since Afghanistan, the U.S. and the Taliban itself are likely to be suspicious of what Islamabad wants in exchange. Pakistan could also act as a spoiler in the process if it believes its interests are not being served.

U.S. officials have expressed skepticism of reconciling with high-level Taliban leaders, preferring instead to focus on persuading junior fighters to switch sides by offering them homes and jobs — along with relatively moderate higher-level members of the regime toppled by the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.

American reluctance is driven by hostility toward senior Taliban figures, many of whom have links with al-Qaida, and the belief they will be unwilling to cut a deal until their battlefield momentum is reversed.

But there has been a flurry of recent activity related to reconciliation, including Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s announcement last week of a planned peace conference that he hoped would include Taliban members. The president traveled to Saudi Arabia on Tuesday in an attempt to enlist the support of the country, which also has historic links to the Afghan Taliban.

Karzai has said he is willing to welcome back any militants who renounce violence and recognize the Afghan constitution. However, the Taliban have always set the withdrawal of international troops as a precondition for any negotiations — a demand that Karzai has called unrealistic.

Karzai has also called on Pakistan to help with reconciliation, acknowledging the country’s unique position to influence the process because of its links with the Taliban and their decision to flee to Pakistan following the 2001 U.S.-led invasion.

“Just about any significant commander network involved in the insurgency has got an address in Pakistan, so Pakistan really does have the ability to be a real positive force,” said Michael Semple, a former European diplomat whom Karzai expelled from Afghanistan two years ago for supposedly unauthorized contacts with the Taliban.

Pakistan has said it would be happy to help but has denied any ongoing ties with Afghan insurgent leaders, who it maintains do not live in Pakistan.

The leaders of the three main Afghan insurgent groups — Mullah Mohammed Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — all received significant support from Pakistan before the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks and are believed to spend at least some of their time holed up in Pakistan’s mountainous border with Afghanistan.

“Certainly Pakistan has enormous leverage because many of these Taliban commanders, leaders and even fighters have their families here,” said Ahmed Rashid, an expert on the Taliban.

But Rashid and others point out that Afghanistan remains wary of Pakistan’s attempts to use its relationship with the Taliban to retain influence inside the country, and also that the militants have often resisted Pakistan’s attempts at control.

“The Pakistani government often tried to influence the Taliban when they were in power in Afghanistan and were often rebuffed,” said Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistan expert at the U.S.-based Atlantic Council. “I don’t think one should overstate the influence, but the fact that there hasn’t been a hostile relationship between the group and the Pakistani military offers a better starting point than any other group.”

Pakistan’s unwillingness to target militants using its territory to launch attacks against U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan has been a source of frustration for Washington. Pakistan says its army is stretched fighting militants waging war against the state — a tactic many analysts believe is meant to preserve its relationship with the groups in anticipation of coalition forces eventually leaving Afghanistan.

Rather than insisting Pakistan target the militants, something that many believe is not in its strategic interest and is increasingly unlikely, some analysts here suggest the U.S. should encourage the country to use its influence with the Taliban to help reach a political settlement.

“The alternative to capture and kill is dialogue and Pakistan can facilitate that, but it probably has certain preconditions that it would like others to meet before it does,” said Rashid.

But he points out that Pakistan must reconcile its potential role with its repeated denials that senior Taliban leaders are based in its territory.

“How do you sell this internationally and what do you say to the Pakistani public who has been told time and again that there is nobody in Pakistan?” said Rashid.